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Does a governor’s gender alter their behavior in policy-making, 
particularly in times of crisis? Despite having the most female governors in 
U.S. history, there has been very little scholarly attention to female governors. 
We study the COVID-19 policy responses of Democratic U.S. governors 
operating under challenging institutional constraints, namely divided 
government, but differ in constraints brought about by gender. We find that in 
the setting of the COVID-19 responses, female governors tend to act faster and 
more aggressively than their male counterparts, namely in social policies. 
However, male governors tend to move faster in closing nonessential 
businesses. Our findings may inform policy-makers in response to future 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has demanded local, state, and national government policy 
responses across the globe. In the United States, state governors acted prior to and to a greater 
degree than the national government. Many governors felt empowered to act swiftly to contain 
the spread of the pandemic and avert a larger public health crisis; however, some states waited 
for the federal government to provide policy guidance.  In part, state political circumstances 
dictate the government’s ability to act. In particular we look to divided government, which 
increases instances of policy gridlock and inter-branch conflict (Bowling and Ferguson 2001). 
This sets the stage for increased conflict in decision-making, even in the midst of crisis, between 
governors and legislatures. 
Though polarization and divided government have made policy-making incredibly 
difficult, what has not been explored is the role gender plays in constraining policy-making, 
particularly in crises. We draw on four states (Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) 
with Democratic governors and divided government that split on gender of the governor. We 
argue that when circumstances demand swift response, female leaders will act even faster than 
their male counterparts. In the particular circumstance of divided government, this propensity is 
further enhanced by the what we postulate is the greater threat of policy obstruction from the 
legislative branch dominated by the opponent party. First we theorize that female leaders move 
swifter than make counterparts because they are held stronger accountable for the potential loss 
of life.  




Second, we also conjecture that female leaders need to safeguard their policies to a 
greater degree from attacks and possible obstruction. We examine whether female governors 
were more likely to act quicker in response to the COVID-19 pandemic within their state by 
providing a case study comparison of male versus female governors facing divided government.  
Gendered Executive Responses and Divided Government  
How does divided government effect relations between the executive and legislative 
branches?  Cox and Kernell (1991) find that divided government leads to institutional conflict 
over policy-making. They argue that executives and legislatures act in their own interest. State 
legislatures and executives are in competition and that a zero-sum game is played between the 
two institutions for power (Bernick and Bernick 2008). This institutional challenge can lead to 
political gridlock, affecting government response to crisis and public opinion. 
The COVID-19 pandemic, like most crises, demand a rapid response from decision-
makers to minimize negative outcomes. Responding to crises involves policymaking.. Female 
leaders who adopt masculine (aka authoritative) leadership styles may be evaluated more harshly 
than men by voters (Rudman 1998). If the opposition-controlled legislature believes they 
represent the true will of the state voters, we can expect they would also react harshly towards 
female leaders.  At the same time, female governors tend to be more focused on social policy1 
than male governors (Heidbreder and Scheurer 2013). In this instance, female governors should 
be more prepared to take decisive action quickly, because most steps regarding COVID-19 




Female Swift++ Swift+ 
 
                                                 
1 Such as social welfare, education, and healthcare.  




male Swift+ Swift 
 
 
 There has been very little scholarly attention to female governors (Bernick 2016) and 
even less on the interaction between a female governor in divided government. Divided 
government poses an institutional obstacle to policymaking. The combination of gender and 
divided government makes policy-making more challenging for female executives, who must 
work with other political actors at some point in the crisis. Anticipating these additional 
challenges due to gendered responses to female executive behavior, female governors will act 
swifter and more aggressively than male governors when making policy in divided government 
settings. 
The Cases 
Of the nine current female governors in the United States, six are Democrats - Brown 
(Oregon), Raimondo (Rhode Island), Kelly (Kansas), Grisham (New Mexico), Mills (Maine), 
and Whitmer (Michigan) - and three are Republicans - Ivey (Alabama), Reynolds (Iowa), and 
Noem (South Dakota).2  Because of a lack of available cases of Republican female governors in 
states with divided government, cases are selected from only Democratic governors. We select 
Michigan, Kansas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin for comparison for a number of reasons. They all 
have divided government with Democratic governors and Republican-held legislatures. The four 
states share a Moralistic political culture, as classified by Elazar (1966). We begin our analysis 
with our two female governors and then proceed to our two male governors. We analyze data 
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from The Public Health Protective Policy Index (PPI) Data Set (Shvetsova et al, 2020) collected 
during the early stages of COVID-19 spread in the United States.  
[Table 1 is here] 
In our case studies, we find that in divided government women act sooner than men (see 
Table 1). Female governors declared state of emergencies before males based on fewer 
confirmed cases. The decision to act on fewer cases also signals that female governors were 
willing to take more authoritative action, thus shirking the existing stereotypes of female 
executives.3  
Female governors were also first movers in regard to school closures. In Kansas and 
Michigan, Governors Laura Kelly and Gretchen Whitmer (respectively) acted more swiftly than 
their male counterparts in declaring the initial school closure and closing schools for the rest of 
the academic year. The faster timing of school closures by female governors than male governors 
                                                 
3 We built a like-wise comparison of four states in the Rocky Mountain-Pacific West 
(Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon), which have Democratic Governors in unified 
governments. Colorado and Nevada have male governors while New Mexico and Oregon have 
female governors. Similar to our divided government case studies, female governors acted faster 
in closing schools initially, closing schools for the year, and declared a state of emergency with 
less COVID-19 cases than male governors. Additionally, male governors again closed non-
essential businesses prior to female governors. While the unified government states declared 
their state of emergency within a five day time period, female governors issued stay-at-home 
orders prior to male governors. In general, female governors tended to act faster and more 
aggressive in unified governments compared to their male counterparts. 




supports the idea that females feel empowered to act bolder on policies that are “female 
dominated”(Heidbreder and Scheurer 2013, Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).   
Female governors did not however act before males when it comes to non-social policy 
agendas. In particular, our male Democratic governors closed nonessential businesses prior to the 
female governors. Female governors likely act slower because they know business closures will 
have a substantial negative impact on personal and state economies. The public tend to punish 
policymakers who they perceive having harmed their economic situation; given that closing 
businesses (and other crisis policy responses) are authoritative, theory would point to an even 
harsher public response. This supports our theory that female governors must be concerned with 
the threat that the legislature will issue challenges in divided government that that would not 
issue against their male counterparts.  
Interestingly, we see no split along gender lines for stay-at-home orders. This follows the 
findings from Shay (2020), which finds gender does not influence the timing of a stay at home 
order. However, the gender of the state health administrator is important, with females being the 
first actors (Shay 2020). Shay does not however look at instances of divided government. We 
argue that divided government creates an important additional institutional hurdle that women 
must overcome.  
Lawsuits illuminate the different degrees of difficulty experienced by governors of 
different genders. A lawsuit filed by the Michigan Republican Party highlights challenges faced 
by female executives. The GOP claims Governor Whitmer cannot extend the state of emergency 
order beyond 28 days without approval from the Legislature. While Governor Walz of 
Minnesota faces a lawsuit over his stay at home order, the key difference is that the suit filed 
against Governor Whitmer focuses on the state of emergency declaration- not the stay at home 




order. This becomes a question of the magnitude of authority that Whitmer has, rather than Walz 
challenge claiming he is discriminating against small businesses and churches.  
Conclusion 
COVID 19 presents a challenge for all levels of government. As responses have been 
state rather than federally led, governors have borne the brunt of these challenges. We examine 
differences between male and female executives governing in divided government. In these 
instances, female governors have generally been the first to act, with more aggressive policies, in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They must take more authoritative actions because they 
face a greater probability of challenges.  
Prior studies find gender does not appear to have a relationship with the timing of stay at 
home orders being implemented (Shay 2020), but when considering the institutional barriers of 
divided government we see women moving before men when faced with the same challenges as 
female governors were willing to act based on fewer cases. Faced with institutional challenges 
(the threat of challenges from divided government), the most effective leaders will move quickly. 
Women face an extra barrier due to gender stereotypes, but speed is critical for pandemic 
response. With future outbreaks likely, which will demand government action, understanding 
how gender affects executive behavior and the ability to govern in divided government is gravely 
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Table 1: COVID-19 Policy Responses by State Governors 
State Kansas (F) Michigan (F) Minnesota (M) Wisconsin (M) 
State of Emergency (SOE) March 12 March 10 March 13 March 12 
COVID-19 Cases @ SoE 6 Persons 2 Persons 14 Persons 8 Persons 
Initial School Closure March 17 March 13 March 18 March 17 
Close School for Year March 17 April 2 April 23 April 24 
10 Person Gathering Limit March 17 March 24* No Record March 17 
Close Businesses March 30 March 22 March 18 March 17 
Mandate Work from Home March 30 March 24 April 8 March 24 
First Quarantine Policy March 15 No Record No Record No Record 
Stay at Home Order March 30 March 24 March 27 March 25 
This tables shows the dates that state executive-enacted policy responses to COVID-19 
went into effect. Shaded boxes indicate that both governors of the same gender acted as at least as 
aggressive as the first moving governor of the opposite gender.  
*Michigan’s social gathering limit policy moved from 50 persons set on March 16 to no 
more than 1 person on March 24. It was the most stringent social gathering ban of the four states. 
 
 
